Legislation on the offence of rape in Icelandic criminal law by Bragadóttir, Ragnheiður
54
Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice • Volume 8, Issue 2, 2020, pp. 54-77
Legislation on the offence of 
rape in Icelandic criminal law 
RAGNHEIÐUR BRAGADÓTTIR *
1. Introduction
For the past few decades sexual offences have been frequently discussed in Iceland. At 
first, the attention centred on how few guilty verdicts there were, as well as the lenient 
punishments, but in recent years attention has also turned to the concept of rape and 
how the crime of rape should be defined in the law. This discussion has taken place in 
the Icelandic Parliament (Althingi), in the courts’ interpretations on the law, among 
scholars, and the public. The Icelandic General Penal Code (GPC) dates from 1940 
and the provisions on sexual offences are in chapter XXII of the GPC.1 In the 80 years 
that have passed since the GPC came into force, chapter XXII has been revised in its 
entirety two times, in 1992 and 2007, and it is the only chapter in the GPC that has 
been subjected to such revision. In this article, section 2 will describe the general 
amendments made on the provisions on sexual offences in 1992, which included 
important amendments made on the provision on rape. Section 3 will then address 
the amendments made in 2007, when a very wide definition of the concept of rape was 
enacted. After that, section 4 will describe the amendments made on the provision on 
rape in 2018, when the word ‘consent’ was taken into the provision itself, but without 
any other major amendments on the provision. The current provision on rape in the 
GPC is made up of all these laws. This article will describe the academic discussion 
and societal views that were the precursor of these amendments. Finally, section 5 will 
evaluate the current provision and discuss whether further amendments are needed.
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2. Revision in 1992: Two fundamental amendments
2.1 Precursor to the amendments  
In chapter XXII of the GPC there are various provisions that provide protection for 
people’s sexual freedom.2 In sections 194-199 there are provisions on rape and other 
related offences. Originally, these provisions were based on the different means used 
for the offences, i.e., violence, threats, abuse, and deceit. Rape, according to section 
194, was the most serious crime and was subject to the most severe punishment. 
Rape was defined as forcing a woman to have sexual intercourse using violence, 
by taking away her freedom, making her afraid for her life, health or wellbeing or 
that of those close to her, or depriving her freedom of action. If means other than 
those listed in section 194 were used to obtain intercourse, for example exploitation, 
abuse or deceit, the offence was not considered to be rape and was subject to much 
more lenient punishment. These provisions were left unchanged for half a century, 
from 1940 to 1992. Convictions for sexual offences were very few during this period 
and such offences were almost never discussed. However, Icelandic society changed 
considerably and knowledge on sexual offences slowly emerged.3 It had long since 
become time to revise the provisions, but the precursor to the revisions must be put 
into context with the development of women’s struggles for gender equality in practice.
 
During the 1960s there was an increase in women who had received an education 
and entered the job market, which until then had mainly been occupied by men. At 
the beginning of the 1980s women became increasingly active in Iceland’s public life 
and the Women’s List ran for offices on the Reykjavík city council, as well as for the 
Parliament. The ideology of the women’s movement was, among other things, that 
women’s experiences and values were different from those of men. Women’s voices had 
to be heard and they had to have an effect in society that was equal to men.4 This was a 
prerequisite for a discussion on protection against sexual violence. At the same time, 
a women’s shelter was founded in Reykjavík. In spring 1984 the offence of rape and 
the rights of the victim were much discussed in society when a controversial custody 
decision in a rape case was met with a harsh reaction from the feminist movement, 
2 It is customary to categorize these provisions into four groups: 1) Rape and other offences against 
people’s sexual freedom, 2) Sexual offences against children, 3) Prostitution and 4) Indecent 
exposure and pornography.
3 Bragadóttir, Kynferðisbrot [Sexual offences] (Lagastofnun Háskóla Íslands 2006) p. 90.
4 Styrkársdóttir, From social movement to political party: the new women’s movement in 
Iceland. The New Women’s Movement - Feminism and Political Power in Europe and the USA 
(1986) pp. 140-157, at 141 and 150.
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as it demanded a revision on the law and its implementation.5 Subsequently, a 
committee of specialists was established, which worked for a few years on researching 
how the law dealt with rape and how rape cases were handled in the criminal justice 
system.6 The result of this work was that the Act on Criminal Procedure was amended 
and the position of the victim was strengthened,7 an emergency room for victims 
was established, the education and training of police and health care workers in 
this field were improved, and Act no. 40/1992, a new chapter on sexual offences, 
was added to the GPC.8 One of the main reasons for the revision of the chapter 
on sexual offences was therefore the influence of the feminist movement, which 
demanded that the provisions on sexual offences should reflect changed attitudes in 
this field, as well as new information available on the handling of these cases in the 
criminal justice system and the consequences that the offences have on the victims.9 
2.2 Non-gender-related provisions – sexual intercourse and other sexual relations
With the law from 1992 two important amendments were made on all the provisions 
on sexual offences. First, all of the chapter’s provisions were changed to non-gender-
related provisions. Before the law was amended, they had been gender-related, i.e., 
only women were protected by the law and could be victims and only men could be 
perpetrators. As biological gender is no longer decisive for the law, now both men and 
women can be perpetrators and victims.10
5 Bragadóttir, Nauðgun og önnur brot gegn kynfrelsi fólks [Rape and Other Offences against People’s 
Sexual Freedom] (Codex 2018) pp. 36-37. The case in question is H 1984, 678 (91/1984). A 
man was accused of raping a girl and having attempted to rape another girl that same night. 
He confessed to the charges, but the demand for him to be held in custody was rejected in 
the district court, as the court deemed that the conditions for investigative interests and likely 
punishment for the offences were not fulfilled. In the Supreme Court, the majority agreed to the 
demand for custody, with rather weak arguments. Many thought that the Court had given in to 
the pressure and anger that had come up in society following the district court’s rejection. 
6 The committee delivered a report on the provisions on rape in the GPC, the criminal procedure 
in rape cases and the victims’ experiences, and put forth suggestions for amendments, see Skýrsla 
nauðgunarmálanefndar [The Report of the Committee on Rape] 1989.
7 Act no. 36/1999, see Bragadóttir and Kristjánsson, Islandsk kronik 1994-1999 [Icelandic 
chronicle 1994-1999] in  87  Nordisk Tidsskrift for Kriminalvidenskab (2000) pp. 333-344, at 339-
340. 
8 Bragadóttir, Islandsk kronik 1984-1993 [Icelandic chronicle 1984-1993] in 81 Nordisk Tidsskrift 
for Kriminalvidenskab (1994) pp. 384-424, at 403-405.
9 Bragadóttir 2018 p. 37.
10 For a long time, there were no examples in Icelandic judgements of a woman being guilty of rape. 
The first known judgement on that is a judgement from a district court in 2007 (S-902/2007), 
where a few female friends went together to a summer house and one of them licked another 
one’s genitals as she was passed out from drinking. In a few judgements in the Supreme Court, 
men have been found guilty of raping other men, for example H 23. May 2013 (93/2013), H 30. 
January 2014 (439/2013) and H 26. November 2015 (152/2015). 
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Secondly, so-called ‘other sexual relations’ were equated with sexual intercourse so 
that the offence is now considered to be rape whether or not it is executed with sexual 
intercourse or other sexual relations. Before the amendments in 1992, an act was not 
rape unless there was sexual intercourse, and other sexual relations were subject to less 
severe punishment, according to a special provision thereon. The term ‘intercourse’ 
was, and still is, defined as traditional sexual intercourse between a man and a woman. 
Before the amendments in 1992 an offence was considered to be attempted rape until 
the perpetrator had penetrated a woman’s vagina with his penis and movements of 
intercourse had begun.11 This changed in 1992 because according to the commentary 
handed in with bill of law no. 40/1992 the intercourse is fully completed when a 
perpetrator penetrates the vagina, whether it be fully or partially, and there does not 
need to have been any ejaculation and the hymen does not need to have ruptured, if 
that is applicable.12 The need to define fully completed sexual intercourse is, however, 
not as important as before, as other sexual relations are now equated with sexual 
intercourse. There is therefore no difference between rape committed through 
intercourse or other sexual relations. But what does ‘other sexual relations’ mean? 
In the commentary from 1992, the concept ‘other sexual relations’ is explained rather 
narrowly as sexual exploitation which is equal to traditional intercourse or has the 
same relevance. These are actions that give the perpetrator sexual satisfaction or 
are generally used for that purpose.13 Here, comes up the question on what kind of 
activity this could be. There are no further explanations in the commentary. Jónatan 
Þórmundsson mentions sexual relations that are directed at other parts of the body 
than genitals or performed with tools.14 The commentary with the bill enacted as 
Act no. 61/2007 further elaborates on the definition of the concept of other sexual 
relations. There it says that by looking at the references made in the commentary for 
the bill of law no. 40/1992 to the contemporary Norwegian provision, judgements, 
and academics’ explanations, including Danish and Norwegian, on corresponding 
concepts in Danish (anden kønslig omgængelse) and Norwegian (seksuell omgang, 
which actually also includes intercourse) laws, we can come to the conclusion that 
the concept ‘other sexual relations’ in the Icelandic GPC includes oral and anal 
sex.15 The same applies to the act of penetrating the vagina or anus with objects or 
fingers, licking or sucking genitals, as well as a perpetrator’s act of making a victim 
masturbate and movements of intercourse between a victim’s thighs, bottom or 
stomach.16 In judgements on rape and other offences against people’s sexual freedom 
it is more common that the act is executed through intercourse than through other 
11 Þórmundsson, Um kynferðisbrot [On Sexual Offences] in 42 Úlfljótur (1989) pp. 21-42, at 32. 
12 Alþingistíðindi [Record of Althingi] 1991-92, A-deild (Section A), p. 788. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Þórmundsson 1989  pp. 21-42, at 30.





sexual relations. Based on judgements, it can be deduced that other sexual relations 
are commonly oral sex or anal sex.17 
2.3 The provisions on rape and other offences against people’s sexual freedom 
after the amendments in 1992
The provisions on rape and other offences against people’s sexual freedom were 
kept in sections 194-199 of the GPC. As before, different means of obtaining sexual 
intercourse or other sexual relations separated the offences and the severity of the 
offences depended on the means used. However, the provisions were amended so 
that the difference between them was made clearer and the wording more modern.18 
The most important provision, and the one that was most tried before the courts, was 
section 194 on rape. The means used for rape were violence or threats thereof. It was the 
most serious of the offences and subject to the most severe punishment, imprisonment 
of at least one year and not exceeding sixteen years. Offences against provisions of 
the chapter other than section 194 did not count as rape in the legal meaning of the 
concept. If the threats were of anything other than violence, the offence would fall 
under section 195 of the GPC on other forms of unlawful sexual coercion. Exploitation 
was the means mentioned in section 196, abuse in sections 197-198, and in section 199 
the means were deceit. Offences against sections 195-199 were subject to much lighter 
punishment than rape according to section 194, i.e., imprisonment not exceeding 
three, four, or six years. Additionally, these provisions were not tried as much in courts 
as the provision in section 194, although during the last years of the 20th century the 
usage increased of the provision in section 196, on offences where the victim’s mental 
handicap, sleep or inebriation was taken advantage of to have intercourse or other 
sexual relations with the victim.19 This practice of the courts confirms that in the Act 
from 1992, the means used to violate people’s sexual freedom were still very important. 
3. Revision in 2007: Comprehensive provision on rape
3.1 Background
During the years after Act no. 40/1992 came into force, common knowledge on 
sexual offences, their characteristics and consequences increased rapidly. Discussion 
in society on these offences became much more open and it became more common 
17 Bragadóttir 2018 p. 89.
18 Bragadóttir 2018 p. 38.
19 Bragadóttir, Kynferðisbrot – Dómabók [Sexual Offences - Judgements] (Codex 2009) p. 427.
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for victims of the offences to step forward and describe their experiences.20 There 
was no doubt anymore how common and harmful these offences were, both to those 
who had to endure them and to society as a whole. Even though convictions for 
certain types of sexual offences had become more frequent, it was clear that many 
of the offences never came into the open. The ratio of reports in these offences 
was increasing in Iceland but there were very few guilty verdicts. As an example, a 
research report revealed that in 2008 there were 88 reports on rape to the police,21 
but only six convictions for rape in the Supreme Court.22 Even though the GPC’s 
provisions on sexual offences had been revised in 1992, there was growing criticism 
on some of the provisions. They were considered to be insufficient in providing the 
victims of the offences the protection they needed, and some thought that there were 
possibly still old and outdated attitudes towards women hidden in the provisions 
themselves. The definition of the concept of rape in the GPC, i.e., the condition 
of violence or threats thereof, was not in accordance with people’s general ideas 
on what rape entailed.23 Additionally, the sentences imposed by the courts were 
thought to be too lenient, especially when children were the victims of the offences.24
In addition to the aforementioned criticism on the GPC’s provisions on sexual 
offences and their application, there was increased criticism on the large difference 
made between sexual offences according to the means used for the offence.25 The 
reason was, among other things, that the essence of a sexual offence was now 
understood as the violation of the victim’s right to self-determination in sex, 
the victim’s freedom and privacy. The means used then became less important.
 
All of this led to the decision in 2005 to revise the provisions in the chapter on sexual 
offences. The Minister of Justice asked me to write a draft bill for amendments on 
the provisions, including the provisions on rape and other offences against people’s 
20 See, for example: Baugalín, Launhelgi lyganna (Mál og menning 2000), Gerður Kristný 
and Ásdísardóttir, Myndin af pabba – saga Thelmu (Forlagið  2005), Jónsson and Elíson, 
Breiðavíkurdrengur – brotasaga Páls Elísonar (Mál og Menning 2007), Hirst, Ekki líta undan – 
Saga Guðrúnar Ebbu dóttur Ólafs Skúlasonar biskups (JPV 2011), Gísladóttir, Hljóðin í nóttinni 
– Minningasaga (Veröld 2014) and Árnadóttir, Mörk – saga mömmu (JPV 2015).
21 Antonsdóttir and Gunnlaugsdóttir, Tilkynntar nauðganir til lögreglu á árunum 2008 og 2009: Um 
afbrotið nauðgun, sakborning, brotaþola og málsmeðferð [Rape reported to the police in 2008 and 
2009: On rape, perpetrators, victims and proceedings] (2013) p. 11.
22 Bragadóttir 2009 pp. 398-399. 
23 Bragadóttir 2018 p. 42.
24 Bragadóttir, Nye lovændringer og strafudmåling for seksualforbrydelser mod børn [Sexual 
offences against children: Revision of the GPC and sentencing] in Kriminalistiske pejlinger – 
Festskrift til Flemming Balvig (Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag 2015), pp. 27-42.
25 This differentiation is criticised in my works: Slægð eða ofbeldi? Um ákvæði 196. gr. hgl. [Cunning 
or Violence? On section 196 of the GPC], Rannsóknir í félagsvísindum VI (Félagsvísindastofnun 
Háskóla Íslands 2005) pp. 271–300 and Er þörf á sérákvæði um aðra ólögmæta kynferðisnauðung? 
[Is a Special Provision on Other Forms of Unlawful Sexual Coercion Necessary?], Rannsóknir í 
félagsvísindum VII (Félagsvísindastofnun Háskóla Íslands 2006) pp. 221–236.
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sexual freedom, sections 194-199 of the GPC. Many sources were consulted when 
writing the bill. First, there was my research on the provisions in the chapter on 
sexual offences in the GPC, both on the law itself and its implementation. This 
research included a review of the Supreme Court’s judgements in this field for the 
past decades, their dissection and comparison. Secondly, the law on sexual offences 
in other countries was researched, especially Danish, Finish, Norwegian and Swedish, 
German, English, and Irish law, and special attention was given to the amendments 
that had then recently been made on the law in some of these countries. Thirdly, 
sociological and criminological research and data concerning the extent and nature 
of these offences in Icelandic society were taken into account. Finally, I familiarised 
myself with the experience of many NGOs’ who work with victims of these offences.26 
In the introduction to the commentary handed in with the bill, I stated that I 
sought to have the amendments proposed fit to the system that already existed in 
the GPC. Emphasis was also put on having the provisions themselves simple and 
clear, but their explanations in the commentary extensive. A particularly important 
goal was to increase the legal protection of women and children and to make the 
provisions more modern. Another goal was to secure, as much as is possible with 
the law, that the privacy, self-determination, sexual freedom, and the freedom of 
action of all individuals would be respected.27 The bill was enacted in 2007, with 
a few minor changes.28 It can be argued that the amendments were based on both 
academic research and the views of the grassroots movements on these offences. 
3.2 A new provision on rape
The most important amendments concerning rape and other offences against people’s 
sexual freedom were a new definition of the concept of rape, as well as provisions 
on objective and subjective considerations to be taken into account in sentencing. 
The provision on rape was made more extensive and offences against people’s sexual 
freedom were no longer differentiated according to the means used for the offence. In 
the commentary submitted with Act no. 61/2007, I discussed in detail how to make 
the provision on rape more extensive. There were two possible options. One was to 
make it more extensive by including more means than violence and threats thereof in 
the provision and thus try to cover all occasions where intercourse and other sexual 
relations happen without consent. Another option was to define rape in the provision 
itself as intercourse or other sexual relations without consent. In the commentary, both 
options were discussed before a conclusion was drawn on which option to choose.29
 
First it was discussed whether rape should be defined based on the concept of 
consent. At that time, discussion in society, especially among feminists, centred on 
26 Bragadóttir 2006 p. 90.
27 Alþingistíðindi [Record of Althingi] 2006–2007 p. 519 and Bragadóttir 2006 p. 92.
28 Act no. 61/2007 on amendments of the GPC (Sexual offences).
29     Alþingistíðindi [Record of Althingi] 2006–2007 pp. 533–534 and Bragadóttir 2006 pp. 111-112. 
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the need to emphasise the victim’s consent or the lack thereof, and that the concept 
of rape had to be defined as based on consent.30 That would prevent cases from 
being dependent on what the victim did or did not do, and shift the focus to the 
unlawful and punishable act performed by the perpetrator. The definition would 
then be similar to the provision on rape in English and Irish law.31 Rape would then 
be considered as sexual intercourse or other sexual relations against the will of the 
victim where the perpetrator knew that the victim had not consented. This definition 
was rejected in the 2007 bill.32 The arguments for the rejection included that a concept 
of rape defined as sexual intercourse or other sexual relations performed without 
the victim’s consent, was too unclear. Defining rape by (lack of) consent also called 
for a detailed explanation on how to define consent. Thus it had to be clear whether 
consent was obtained legally and not by unlawful means, for example violence, 
threats, or unlawful coercion, and that the victim was capable of giving consent. It was 
considered debatable whether a definition like this would really solve the problem, 
because proving a subjective concept like consent or the lack thereof would be very 
difficult. That type of proof would probably also focus on behaviour of the victim, 
i.e., what the victim said or indicated, instead of the perpetrator’s behaviour. This 
was not desirable. Additionally, it was argued that the lack of consent was included 
in the concept of rape, because it was the lack of consent that made the act rape and 
therefore punishable.33 The conclusion in 2007 was therefore not to define the concept 
of rape only by lack of consent to the intercourse or other sexual relations, but to 
make the existing provision more extensive so that more means than before would be 
punishable.34 In order to describe the offence of rape clearly, and thereby to fulfil the 
requirement for the clarity of criminal provisions, means were mentioned which were 
supposed to cover the incidents where intercourse or other sexual relations occurred 
without the victim’s consent.35 In the new provision from 2007, the concept of rape 
was mentioned in the provision itself for the first time, and the provision included 
a description of what the offence of rape contained. After the amendments done 
on the provision on rape with Act no. 61/2007, the new provision looked like this:
30 Ibid. 
31 In English law (Sexual Offences Act 2003) the elements of rape are that the perpetrator 
intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus, or mouth of the victim with his penis, the victim 
does not consent to the penetration, and the perpetrator does not reasonably believe that the 
victim consents. Here, consent is defined as a person freely agreeing by choice and having the 
freedom and capacity to make that choice. According to Irish law (the Criminal Law (Rape) 
(Amendment) Act 1990) a man commits rape if (a) he has unlawful sexual intercourse with a 
woman who at the time of the intercourse does not consent to it, and (b) at that time he knows 
that she does not consent to the intercourse or he is reckless as to whether she does or does not 
consent to it.
32 Alþingistíðindi [Record of Althingi] 2006–2007 pp. 533–534 and Bragadóttir 2006 pp. 111-112.  
33 Bragadóttir 2006 p. 76.
34 Alþingistíðindi [Record of Althingi] 2006–2007 p. 534 and Bragadóttir 2006 pp. 111–112.
35 Alþingsitíðindi [Record of Althingi] 2006-2007 p. 552 and Bragadóttir 2006 p. 136. 
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‘Section 194 subsection 1: Any person who has sexual intercourse or other sexual 
relations with a person by means of using violence, threats or other unlawful coer-
cion shall be guilty of rape and shall be imprisoned for a minimum of 1 year and a 
maximum of 16 years. ‘Violence’ here refers to the deprivation of independence by 
means of confinement, drugs or other comparable means.
  Section 194 subsection 2: Exploiting a person’s psychiatric disorder or other mental 
handicap, or the fact that, for other reasons, he or she is not in a condition to be able 
to resist the action or to understand its significance, in order to have sexual inter-
course or other sexual relations with him or her, shall also be considered as rape, and 
shall result in the same punishment as specified in the first paragraph of this Article.’36
With this provision the concept of rape was made much more extensive than it was 
before and there were four changes that caused this.
First, the element of force was removed from the provision on rape. Before the 
amendments in 2007, force was a part of the wording of the provision, which said 
that it was punishable to force a person to have sexual intercourse or other sexual 
relations. This wording made clear the assumption that rape included force. But the 
problem with this wording was that it could lead to too much emphasis on proving 
the victim’s reaction in rape cases, for example whether the victim fought back against 
the perpetrator, and with this the perpetrator’s actions lost their importance. In a 
Supreme Court judgement from 2004 this was very apparent, where the result was 
based on whether the use of force was proven.37
 
In this case, M, 22 years old, was accused of offences against sections 194 and 196 of the 
GPC for forcing his 14-year-old cousin, Y, to other sexual relations than intercourse by 
pressing her head up against his penis, forcing his penis into her mouth and holding her 
head tightly while he moved his penis front and back and having to some degree used 
the fact that she was not able to resist the action because of inebriation. The Supreme 
Court said it was obvious that the accused had exploited his age and position as Y’s 
older relative and confidant, as well as Y’s inebriation. Nevertheless, the conclusion was 
that M was acquitted. It was not deemed proven beyond reasonable doubt that Y had 
been so inebriated that she could not have resisted the act. It was also deemed unclear 
whether she had been forced and the accused had to be given the benefit of the doubt.
It was very unfortunate to have verdicts depend on what the victim did or did not 
do, just as happened in this case, instead of being mainly about the unlawful and 
punishable act of the perpetrator. That was the reason why force was removed from 
the provision on rape in 2007 and more emphasis being put on the causal connection 
between violence, threats, or other forms of unlawful coercion, and the intercourse 
36 Official translation obtained from: https://www.government.is/library/Files/General_Penal_
Code_sept.-2015.pdf 
37 H 2004, 1111 (416/2003).
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or the sexual relations the perpetrator obtains. After the amendments in 2007, the 
emphasis was therefore on the unlawful act of the perpetrator, which is the core of 
the crime and what the proof is supposed to focus on, not on whether the victim 
was forced and if or how the victim defended her/himself against the attack. If it 
was proven that the perpetrator used violence, threats, or other forms of unlawful 
coercion to have intercourse, it had to be assumed that the victim was forced to have 
intercourse, because otherwise these means would not have been necessary to obtain 
it. Additionally, it was assumed that the new wording reflected better how women 
react to attacks than the older wording of section 194. With the amendments on the 
provision on rape in 2018 this definition has become part of the definition of consent.38
Secondly, the provision in section 194 on rape was made more extensive so that 
other forms of unlawful sexual coercion now became defined as rape.39 This meant 
that all threats, not only threats of violence, were now included in section 194. In 
1940 the means, according to section 194, were to make the woman fearful of her 
own life, health, or wellbeing or that of those close to her. In 1992 the provision was 
amended, and the means were made more extensive in two ways.40 Thus the provision 
reached all punishable threats of violence, but not other threats. Additionally, it was 
no longer required that a threat should invoke fear of life, health, or wellbeing. In 
the commentary, it said that threats of violence were generally so serious in nature 
that it was unnecessary to keep this requirement.41 If threats of something other than 
violence had been used to obtain sexual intercourse, section 195 on other unlawful 
sexual coercion was applicable to the offence. After Act no. 61/2007 came into force, 
all threats were included in section 194 subsection 1 on rape and it was therefore 
no longer required that a threat included violence. The nature of the threat could 
be various, and the provision’s content was therefore much more extensive than 
before. The threat had to be essential to the perpetrator obtaining sexual intercourse 
or other sexual relations which he/she would otherwise not have obtained, i.e., 
there had to be a causal connection between the threat and the sexual intercourse. 
The less weight that a threat carries, the less likely it is to have led to intercourse.42
Thirdly, the exploitation of mentally ill and disabled people and those who cannot 
defend themselves against the offence because of inability was defined as rape with 
the Act from 2007.43 These were offences that were previously considered to be sexual 
exploitation according to section 196, which was subject to much more lenient 
punishment than rape according to section 194, i.e., imprisonment not exceeding six 
years. The first decades after the GPC from 1940 came into force, the contemporary 
38  Bragadóttir 2018 pp. 101-103. 
39  See section 3 Act no. 40/1992, formerly section 195 of the GPC.
40  Act no. 40/1992.
41  Alþingistíðindi [Record of Althingi] 1991-92 p. 789.
42  Bragadóttir 2018 p. 135. 
43  See section 194 subsection 2.
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section 196 of the GPC was almost never applied, but after the turn of the millennium 
there was a slow increase in cases.44 It did, however, catch my attention that the 
provision, which was supposed to specifically protect the mentally ill and disabled, 
seemed to have the opposite effect, i.e., they actually had less legal protection than 
those who were completely healthy. Supporting this statement was the fact that there 
seemed to be no cases in the Supreme Court on rape according to section 194 of a 
mentally ill or disabled victim. Such offences seemed to always fall under section 196, 
which were subject to much less severe punishment than rape according to section 
194. The arguments for this were probably that no violence had been used. But the 
counterargument was that the perpetrator often does not need to use violence, because 
those who are mentally ill or disabled will give in without it. Threatening looks or 
orders can be enough for the perpetrator to get his/her way and such behaviour often 
includes threats of violence which should have been sufficient for a guilty verdict 
according to section 194. It would also be difficult to argue why sexual intercourse 
obtained with violence is a more serious offence than intercourse with an unconscious 
person, who for example is sleeping in his/her own bed and not expecting anything 
bad to happen, or a disabled person, who is defenceless and cannot save him/herself.45 
In the commentary with the bill of law no. 61/2007 it was pointed out that this 
emphasis on violence as means was outdated and did not reflect the reality that 
victims of the offences experienced. The most serious aspect of the offences in 
sections 194-199 is that they violate people’s sexual freedom, their freedom of 
action, privacy, and self-determination in sex. It could therefore be argued that it 
was not right to differentiate between offences against people’s sexual freedom 
based on which means were used to carry out the offences. Sexual offences 
against those who are mentally ill, disabled, sleeping, or unconscious are all just 
as serious as rape according to section 194 and the law had to reflect this fact.46 
With the Act from 2007 the legal status of this group therefore greatly improved. 
   
Fourthly, the provision in section 199 of the GPC on punishment where deceit 
was the means used to obtain sexual intercourse was abolished. This provision 
detailed criminal liability in three types of situations where the perpetrator abused 
44 Bragadóttir 2009 p. 427. The first judgements in the Supreme Court where the provision was 
applied date from 1986-89. The accused were found guilty of sexual intercourse with disabled 
women, i.e., H 1986, 682 (21/1986), H 1987, 1179 (90/1987), H 1989, 343 (201/1988) and H 1989, 
352 (227/1988). It was first in 1991 that a perpetrator was found guilty in the Supreme Court for 
a sexual offence against a woman who could not resist his actions because she was passed out 
from drinking, i.e., H 1991, 802 (46/1991).
45 Bragadóttir 2006 p. 101. 
46 Þingskjal [Document of Althingi] 20 ‒ 20. mál, 133. löggjafarþing 2006–2007 pp. 11-12 and 
Bragadóttir 2006 p. 101.
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the victim’s misunderstanding of the situation to have intercourse.47 This provision 
was very rarely tried by the courts, and only used twice in the Supreme Court’s 
judgements for over more than 60 years, from 1940 to 2006.48 The arguments for 
abolishing the provision were that it could most likely be applicable if the victim 
of an offence was asleep, had a mental illness, or a disability. If the victim was in 
such a condition, this would be a more serious crime than described in section 199, 
i.e., exploitation, and the conditions for criminal liability in section 194 subsection 
2 on rape were fulfilled. There was therefore no need for this provision anymore.
With this new definition from 2007 the concept of rape became very extensive. 
The purpose was that the new provision on rape should cover those incidents 
where sexual intercourse or other sexual relations were had against the victim’s 
will, i.e., without the victim’s consent, as it was the essence of rape that there was 
no consent to the intercourse, even though this was not explicitly stated in the 
provision itself. With the new provision, emphasis was laid on the fact that sexual 
intercourse was had with a victim without consent and it was thereby a violation 
of the victim’s self-determination and sexual freedom.49 The main models for the 
provision were new amendments on the Norwegian and Swedish criminal codes.50
3.3 Violence, threats and other forms of unlawful coercion
Violence, according to section 194, is a very broad concept. There are no requirements 
on the nature of the violence. An attack does not have to lead to physical injuries, loss 
of health, or any consequences other than the intercourse which was the objective of 
the violence, as intercourse is the most important part of the offence. There are also no 
requirements regarding the victim having to actively fight back.51 It was presumed that 
the provision on rape in section 194 would always be used along with the provisions 
on the sexual abuse of children when an adult has intercourse or other sexual relations 
with a child, as this is the exploitation of the superior position the adult has over 
the child. In recent years, this understanding has been recognized by the courts.52
47 These incidences were: The victim thought, wrongly, that the sexual intercourse were performed 
within a marriage or a common-law marriage, the victim thought he/she was having sexual 
intercourse with someone other than he/she really was, for example because of darkness, or 
sexual intercourse was had because he/she had been deceived that it was a medical or otherwise 
scientific treatment. 
48 These are H 1943, 167 (52/1942) and H 1996, 3030 (289/1996).
49 Alþingistíðindi [Record of Althingi] 2006–2007 pp. 533–534 and Bragadóttir 2018 pp. 101-103.
50 Chapter 26: On sexual offences, in the Norwegian Criminal Code (Straffeloven, Lov-2005-05-
20-28) from 2005 with amendments. Chapter 6: On sexual offences, in the Swedish Criminal 
Code (Brottsbalken 1962:700), as amended in 2005.
51 Bragadóttir 2018 p. 124.
52 H 1. October 2015 (170/2015), H 8. June 2017 (733/2016), L 19. October 2018 (229/2018) and L 
5. April 2019 (368/2018).
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There are no requirements for threats used and all threats are included in the 
provision. The threat can include legal actions, such as threatening to file a charge 
for actual theft, or illegal, such as threats of violence, destruction of property, or 
defamation.53 Threats can therefore concern anything and must only have the effect 
that the victim gives in. The threats most often tried by the courts are threats of 
violence. This includes threats of violence performed immediately or later. Threats 
of publishing nude or sexual photos on the internet without consent if the victim 
does not do what the perpetrator wants is a new reality and can be categorized as 
a threat according to section 194 and be rape or attempted rape.54 This has come 
up in Supreme Court judgements, for example in a judgement from 2016.55
In this case, X was accused of attempted rape by threatening to publicly spread sexual 
conversations had with B, a 15-year-old boy, and a picture of B’s genitals if B would 
not have intercourse with him before 23 o’clock that same night. He put an enormous 
amount of pressure on B in his communication with him online and did not stop 
pressuring him until just before 23 o’clock when B’s mother became aware of what was 
happening and took over the communication. The district court deemed it proven 
that X wanted to obtain sexual intercourse this way and that X’s actions had shown 
that intention beyond any doubt. X was therefore found guilty of attempted rape, i.e., 
an offence against section 194 subsection 1, cf. section 20 subsection 1 of the GPC. The 
majority in the Supreme Court (three of five) confirmed the district court’s judgement 
that it was proven that X had threatened B, that B had taken the threats seriously, and 
that X had used the threats to try to force B to have sexual intercourse with him. Thus, 
X had shown beyond reasonable doubt his direct intention to complete an offence 
against section 194 subsection 1 and the district court’s judgement was confirmed.
The means ‘other forms of unlawful coercion’ were added to the bill of law at the 
suggestion of the attorney general. The concept can include incidents where difference 
in age or situation makes the victim unable to resist sexual intercourse. In recent 
years there has been an increase in sexual offence cases where the perpetrator is 
accused and found guilty for sexual intercourse which is obtained with other forms 
of unlawful coercion, not with violence or threats. From the beginning of 2012 to 
the end of 2017 there were sixteen Supreme Court judgements where a person was 
accused of an offence against section 194 subsection 1 using unlawful coercion only. 
The accused was found guilty in nine of these cases. The victims of all these cases were 
children between eleven and eighteen years old, except in one case where the age was 
not disclosed. In most of these cases, the accused abused the superior position he had 
due to difference in age and maturity and took the child to a secluded or unfamiliar 
place, or somewhere the circumstances made the child feel frightened and helpless.56
53 Bragadóttir 2018 p. 135.  
54 Bragadóttir, Nauðgun [Rape] (Lagastofnun Háskóla Íslands 2015) p. 101.  
55 H 15. December 2016 (441/2016).
56 Bragadóttir 2018 p. 150-151. 
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In one case, X, 18 years old, was found guilty of sexual offences against two thirteen-
year-old girls. In one instance he used unlawful coercion to force B, who was the 
friend of X’s thirteen-year-old niece, to have oral sex with him. He took B to an 
apartment where people aged 21-28 were listening to loud music, behaving erratically, 
drinking alcohol, and taking euphoriant drugs. These were circumstances which 
would make a thirteen-year-old child feel frightened and helpless. The accused was 
found guilty according to section 194 subsection 1 and section 202 subsection 1.57
 
In the explanations in the commentary to draft bill to Act no. 61/2007 which defined 
other sexual relations, there was no mention of a perpetrator forcing a victim to 
masturbate or a perpetrator forcing two victims to have sexual intercourse. The 
bill’s examples of other sexual relations was not exclusive due to the nature of the 
concept. There is therefore no reason that the aforementioned actions should not 
be included in the concept, if applicable. Courts have agreed to this perspective and 
have interpreted the provision on rape, so that a perpetrator is guilty of rape if he 
makes victims have sexual intercourse with each other. In a judgement from 2011, for 
example, the accused was found guilty for an offence against section 194 subsection 
2 and section 202 subsection 1 of the GPC, by making his mentally disabled cousins 
have sexual intercourse and oral sex, with the victims being too afraid to refuse.58 The 
same applies if the accused does not have sexual intercourse with the victim himself, 
but makes other men, who perform the act believing that the victim has consented, 
such as in  H 12. May 2010 (502/2009) where the accused repeatedly forced his 
girlfriend, who was living with him, to have sexual intercourse with other men.59
The explanations above reveal that with the amendments of the law in 2007, less 
emphasis was on the means of the offence, but rather whether sexual intercourse had 
occurred without the victim consenting to it, even though the concept of rape was 
not defined by the lack of consent in itself.60 This emphasis on the lack of consent 
is evident in Supreme Court cases after 2007, for example in a case from 2017.61
In this case, two men had sexual intercourse and other sexual relations with a woman, 
P, at the same time and together at the home of one of them. Because P was inebriated 
she could not resist. P did not know the men at all and did not know where she was. 
The Supreme Court did not deem it proven that P’s situation had been such that 
section 194 subsection 2 was applicable. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the 
district court’s assessment that it was beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had 
57 See H 20. March 2014 (689/2013). Section 202 subsection 1 of the GPC on the criminal liability 
of having sexual intercourse or other sexual relations with a child under the age of 15.
58  H 7. April 2011 (570/2010), see also Bragadóttir 2018 p. 401.
59  Bragadóttir 2018 pp. 177-179.
60  Bragadóttir 2018 p. 44. 
61  H 20. June 2017 (486/2016).
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abused P’s situation, who ‘had no capacity to give her consent because of inebriation,’ 
to obtain sexual intercourse. The big difference in situation and strength between P 
and the accused was also taken into account. They were found guilty under section 
194 subsection 1 of the GPC. In its decision, the Supreme Court included references 
to the commentary handed in with bill of law no. 61/2007, where it said that section 
194 subsection 1 should be understood so that the essence of a sexual offence is that a 
person’s right to sexual freedom has been violated, and less emphasis is on the means 
of the offence.  
3.4 Culpability 
Intent is a condition of culpability for rape, and motivation for the actions does 
not matter. Rape due to negligence has not been discussed as much in Iceland as 
in the other Nordic countries. However, in the commentary with bill of law no. 
61/2007 there was a discussion on whether a provision on rape due to negligence 
should be taken into force. This discussion referenced the Norwegian provision on 
rape due to gross negligence and its practice in Norway.62 In Norway this provision 
came into force in 2000.63 The majority of the committee on sexual offences had not 
recommended such a provision,64 but the Norwegian Ministry of Justice disagreed.65 
There are some judgements on grossly negligent rape in Norway, even though they 
are not many.66 The amendments on section 194 in the Icelandic GPC with Act no. 
61/2007 made the provision on rape very extensive, as described above. Considering 
the extensive description of the crime of rape, the idea of adding a provision on 
negligent rape to Icelandic law, was rejected. In connection with this, it is important 
that punishment for offences due to negligence in Icelandic law is always much 
more lenient than for offences committed with intent, and this applies to both the 
maximum punishment according to the law and the court’s sentences. If rape due 
to negligence were to be implemented in the law, there would be a danger that some 
offences, which were being punished for as offences of intent, would be considered 
as offences due to negligence and thereby lessen the victim’s legal protection.
62 Alþingistíðindi [Record of Althingi] 2006-2007 pp. 531-533, Bragadóttir 2006 pp. 108-111 and 
Bragadóttir 2018 pp. 410-422. Section 294 in the Norwegian Criminal Code [Straffeloven 
2005-05-20-28]: Grossly negligent sexual assault is punishable by imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding six years. If circumstances as specified in section 293 (on aggravated sexual assault) 
exist, the penalty shall be imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years. 
63 Act 2000-08-11-76.
64 NOU 1997:23. Norges offentlige utredninger. Sexuallovbrudd [Official Norwegian Report. 
Sexual Offences].
65 Ot.prp. nr. 28 (1999-2000) Om lov om endringer i straffeloven mv. (seksuallovbrudd) [On Law 
on Amendments to the Penal Code (Sexual Offences)]. 
66 See Hennum, Grovt uaktsom voldtekt [Grossly negligent sexual assault]. Bilaga 3, in 
Leijonhufvud, Samtyckesutredningen – Lagskydd för den sexuella integriteten (Thomson Förlag 
2008) pp. 113-119, at 117. 
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3.5 The most extensive provision on rape in the Nordic countries 
It can be argued that with the amendments in 2007, section 194 of the GPC on 
rape, according to Act no. 61/2007, became the most extensive provision on rape 
in force in the Nordic countries at the time.67 It was more extensive than the Nor-
wegian provision on rape because all instances where the perpetrator exploits the 
mental illness or disabilities of a victim are defined as rape in Icelandic law, but in 
Norwegian law only some of these instances are considered to be rape.68 The Ice-
landic provision was more extensive than the contemporary Swedish provision, be-
cause according to the Swedish provision, the threats used had to be threats about 
illegal actions while in the Icelandic provision any threat is applicable if it has the 
effect that the perpetrator obtains sexual intercourse by means of it.69 In Danish law 
the abuse of the mentally ill or disabled is not defined as rape and is subject to less-
er punishment than rape, but in Icelandic law this is also considered to be rape.70 
There is no doubt that the provision in section 194 of the GPC, according to Act 
no. 61/2007, and in fact the provisions on rape in all the Nordic countries, are in 
conformity with the countries’ obligations according to international conventions.
67 Bragadóttir, Begrebet voldtægt i et nordisk perspektiv [The concept of rape in a Nordic 
perspective] NSfK´s 58. Research Seminar Report. Nordic Research Council for Criminology 
(2016) pp. 263-273.
68 According to section 295 in the Norwegian Criminal Code, a penalty of imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding six years shall be applied to any person who obtains sexual activity for himself/
herself or another person or makes a person perform acts corresponding to sexual activity on 
himself/herself by exploiting a person’s mental illness or mental disability, provided the conduct 
does not fall within the scope of section 291 on rape.
69 According to the contemporary section 1, chapter 6 in the Swedish Criminal Code (2005), 
any person who forced another person to have sexual intercourse or other sexual relations by 
use of violence or a threat of a criminal act was guilty of rape and should be punished with 
imprisonment from two and up to six years. The Swedish government suggested amendments 
on the provision on rape based on the lack of consent and these amendments took effect 1. July 
2018. According to the current chapter 6, section 1 on rape in the Swedish Criminal Code, a 
person can never be considered to be participating voluntarily in sexual intercourse, or in some 
other sexual act comparable to it, if their participation is a result of assault, other violence or a 
threat of a criminal act, a threat to bring a prosecution against or report another person for an 
offence, or a threat to give detrimental information about another person. 
70 According to section 218, in the Danish Criminal Code, any person who, by exploitation of 
another person’s mental illness or mental deficiency, procures for himself sexual intercourse 
with that person shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding four years. Rape 
according to section 216 is punished with imprisonment for any term not exceeding eight years.
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4. A definition of rape based on consent, Act no. 16/2018
4.1 Precursor to the amendments
Even though there has been an extensive provision on rape in Icelandic law since 
2007 and the time when violence or threat thereof was required for an offence to 
count as rape was long gone, the discussion in society on how to define the concept 
of rape continued, especially among feminists and some Members of the Parliament 
(MP). However, the Act from 2007 had made an impact, and prosecutors and 
judges had become much more progressive than before in their approach to these 
offences. Knowledge about the offences, their characteristics, and consequences 
has steadily increased and the discussion in society now is quite different from 
2007 when the Act no. 61/2007 came into force. An example of this would be the 
#metoo-movement, which was at its peak in winter 2018. Women of many different 
professions, e.g., in politics, media, sports, performance arts, and the criminal 
justice system, created Facebook groups where they shared their stories. Some men 
lost their jobs and companies and institutions declared that they would improve.
 
In autumn 2007 a few MPs put forth a bill for amendments on section 194 subsection 
1 of the GPC, in which the definition of rape was to be completely abolished. The 
proposal for the wording of the provision was as follows: Any person who is guilty 
of rape is liable to imprisonment for a minimum of 2 years and not exceeding 16 
years.71 The commentary handed in with the bill said that there were too few 
convictions and the MPs maintained that the bill had to be enacted to increase 
their number. The concept of rape would then not need to be defined, because it 
would be generally known, and the commentary referenced a few concepts that 
are not defined in the GPC for comparison, for example the concept of theft.72
 
It is difficult to see how the goal of increased convictions could have been ob-
tained with this bill. Its effect could easily have been the complete opposite. If this 
bill had been enacted it is likely that the older and traditional definition on rape 
would have been applied in its implementation, a definition which is based on vi-
olence and threats thereof. Rape must be defined, and that statement should not 
require any further argument than to point out that the definition on rape in the 
Act from 2007 is completely different from its definition in older provisions. The bill 
that the MPs put forth was undoubtedly well-intended, but unfortunately it was not 
well-reasoned. It was put forth five more times from 2007 to 2013 but not enacted, 
71 Þingskjal  [Document of Althingi] 673  – 420. mál, 135. löggjafarþing 2007–2008.  https://www.
althingi.is/altext/pdf/135/s/0673.pdf 
72 Ibid. p. 4.
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as such a vague provision could have caused many problems when implemented.73
In 2014 a research report on professionals’ views on the handling of rape cases within
 the criminal justice system was published, along with suggestions on improvements.74 
The report pointed out the low ratio of indictments in rape cases and that the 
prosecutors were of the opinion that further amendments to the provision on rape 
could make it easier to provide evidence of rape. The report therefore stated that 
further research was needed on whether to change the provision so that ‘the essence 
of the provision would be the lack of consent, instead of violence and threats.’75 This 
statement is not completely correct, however, as violence and threats no longer were 
the essence of the offence of rape and any means used to get sexual intercourse 
or other sexual relations against the victim’s will were considered to be rape.
4.2 The concept of consent is added to the provision
During winter 2016-2017 the idea of defining rape based on consent was taken up 
again when a new draft bill was put forth in the Parliament on amendments to section 
194 subsection 1 of the GPC.76 This was the initiative of some of Viðreisn’s MPs, which 
was one of the three political parties in Iceland’s cabinet at the time. When writing the 
bill of law, the Swedish report on increased protection on sexual freedom was used 
as an example, including suggestions on defining rape by lack of consent.77 The bill 
suggested making ‘consent the main part in the definition of rape,’ and that a defini-
tion of when there is consent and when not would be included in the provision itself. 
This suggestion brought consent into the provision and fulfilled the clarity require-
ment, as it defines when there is and is no consent. This definition applies the same 
concepts as the law from 2007, i.e., violence, threats, and other unlawful coercion.78
The draft bill on amendments on the provision on rape was put forth in the Parliament 
73 See þingskjal  [Document of Althingi] 138 ‒ 127. mál, 136. löggjafarþing 2008–2009, þingskjal 
[Document of Althingi] 45 ‒ 45. mál, 138. löggjafarþing 2009–2010, þingskjal  [Document of 
Althingi] 49 ‒ 48. mál, 139. löggjafarþing 2010–2011, þingskjal  [Document of Althingi] 98 ‒ 98. 
mál, 140. löggjafarþing 2011–2012 and þingskjal [Document of Althingi] 372 ‒ 325. mál, 141. 
löggjafarþing 2012–2013.
74 Antonsdóttir: Viðhorf fagaðila til meðferðar nauðgunarmála innan réttarkerfisins og tillögur að 
úrbótum [Professionals’ Views on the Handling of Rape Cases within the Criminal Justice System and 
Suggestions on Improvements], Edda-öndvegissetur, unnið í samvinnu við innanríkisráðuneytið 
2014. This research was supported by Edda Centre of Excellence at the University of Iceland and 
done in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior.
75 Ibid. p. 88.
76 Þingskjal [Document of Althingi] 552 ‒ 419. mál, 146. löggjafarþing 2016–2017.
77 See SOU 2016:60. The amendments on the chapter on sexual offences in the Swedish Criminal 
Code [Brottsbalken], which are based on this report, came into force 1. July 2018.




two more times and accepted as Act no. 16/2018. It came into force 13. April 2018 and 
now the provision on rape reads as follows:79
‘Section 194 subsection 1: Any person who has sexual intercourse or other sexual 
relations with a person without his or her consent shall be guilty of rape and shall 
be imprisoned for a minimum of 1 year and a maximum of 16 years. Consent is 
considered to have been given if it is freely stated. Consent is not considered to have 
been given if violence, threats, or other  forms of unlawful coercion are employed. 
‘Violence’ here includes deprivation of freedom of action by means of confinement, 
drugs, or other comparable means.   
Section 194 subsection 2: The use of deception, or the exploitation of a person’s mis-
conception regarding the situation, or of his or her psychiatric disorder or other men-
tal handicap, or of the fact that, for other reasons, he or she is not in a condition to be 
able to resist the action or to understand its significance, in order to have sexual inter-
course or other sexual relations with him or her, shall also be considered as rape, and 
shall result in the same punishment as specified in the first paragraph of this Article.’’80
In addition to the concept of consent being added to the provision on rape in section 
194, it was suggested in the bill of law to add to the section the means when a 
perpetrator uses deception or exploits the victim’s misunderstanding of the situation. 
The bill originally added these means to subsection 1 in the provision and thus it 
would have been a part of the definition on consent. However, according to the 
suggestions of the Ministry of Justice’s Standing Committee on Criminal Law, these 
means fit better in section 194 subsection 2,81 and when the bill was discussed in 
the Parliament this change was accepted. A provision on the means of deceit or the 
exploitation of a victim’s misunderstanding to have sexual intercourse had been in 
section 199 of the GPC before the amendments in 2007, when it was abolished, as 
79 See þingskjal  [Document of Althingi] 10 ‒ 10. mál, 148. löggjafarþing 2017–2018 and my review 
submitted to Althingi’s Judicial Affairs and Education Committee, 22. January 2018 <http://
www.althingi.is/altext/erindi/148/148-205.pdf> 
80 Translation obtained from the Ministry of Justice’s website <https://www.government.is/lisalib/
getfile.aspx?itemid=dd8240cc-c8d5-11e9-9449-005056bc530c>
81 Umsögn refsiréttarnefndar til Alþingis [A review of the Ministry of Justice’s Standing Committee 
on Criminal Law submitted to the Althingi], 26. February 2018 <http://www.althingi.is/altext/
erindi/148/148-367.pdf> 
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has been discussed above.82 This old provision included incidents where a victim 
thought he/she was having intercourse with someone other than he/she really was. 
This was, for example, applicable if the victim was blind or if the incident happened 
in darkness. This conduct was not defined as rape before the amendments in 2007 
and was subject to much more lenient punishment than rape, i.e., imprisonment not 
exceeding six years. When the chapter on sexual offences was revised with Act no. 
61/2007 the provision in the contemporary section 199 of the GPC was abolished. 
The argument was that this provision was most likely to be applied if the victim of 
the offence was sleeping, mentally ill or disabled. If this was the victim’s condition, 
it would be a much more serious offence than described in the contemporary 
section 199 and should be defined as rape, as per section 194. In the commentary 
with the bill of law from 2007 it was therefore concluded that the provision was no 
longer relevant, as its contents were moved to the provision on rape.83 However, the 
Supreme Court did not agree with this point of view in a judgement from 2010.84
In this case, A went to party at Hotel Borg, where she met B, and went with him to his 
hotel room. They chatted and had sexual intercourse. B then went out, but A fell asleep 
in bed. Later A became aware that a man came to bed and lay down behind her. They 
had sexual intercourse and she did not see the man’s face until a few minutes later. 
This man turned out to be a different man from the one she had gone to bed with. This 
man, X, was accused of having had sexual intercourse with her against her will and 
had exploited the fact that she was not able to resist the action or to understand its 
significance as she thought he was a different man. In the indictment the act was said 
to be mainly an offence against section 194 subsection 2, or section 209 on violation 
against decency, in case section 194 was not accepted. The district court, and later the 
Supreme Court, deemed that these actions were not applicable to section 194 subsection 
2’s description of the offence, but that section 199 subsection 1 in the abolished law 
would have been applicable. X was therefore found guilty of violation against decency, 
according to section 209 of the GPC, which is a much more lenient offence than rape.
As the Supreme Court did not agree to this interpretation of section 194 subsection 
2, it was necessary to include this interpretation clearly in section 194 of the GPC on 
82 Träskman, Om straffbar ‘tilsnigelse’ i ett nordiskt perspektiv [On Criminal Deceit from a Nordic 
Perspective] in 81 Nordisk Tidsskrift for Kriminalvidenskab (1994) pp. 111-121, at 114. Provisions 
comparable to this former Icelandic section 199 on deceit or the victim’s misunderstanding of 
the situation were in the Norwegian Criminal Code (section 195) and the Danish Criminal Code 
(section 221), but abolished in Norway in 1927. It is still in force in the Danish Criminal Code, 
but was amended in 2013, and is now as follows: ‘Any person who has sexual intercourse with any 
other person who mistakes the perpetrator for someone else shall be liable to imprisonment for 
any term not exceeding four years.’ Such provisions were not in the Swedish or Finish Criminal 
Codes.
83 Bragadóttir 2006 pp. 105-106.
84 H 20. May 2010 (620/2009).
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rape.85 This has been accomplished now.86
4.3 Definition of the concept of consent 
In the commentary handed in with the bill of law in 2018, it says that according 
to the new wording in section 194 subsection 1, the provisions’ main emphasis is 
on whether sexual intercourse is performed with the will and consent of those in-
volved.87 The main requirement is that there is no consent to the sexual intercourse. 
Consent to taking part in the intercourse must be given with words or other un-
mistakable expression. Therefore, consent must be expressed in some way. Active 
participation can be interpreted as consent on the part of one or more participants. 
Complete omission will not be interpreted as willing participation. It is not re-
quired that the victim protests or struggles against participation in sexual actions. 
The consent is only limited to that specific instance and the sexual actions that the 
consent is given to at each time. A participant in a sexual action can change his/
her mind whenever, but must then express that with words or in another way so 
that other participants realise it.88 These last points are not new, because they were 
emphasized in 2007. In the commentary with bill of law no. 16/2018, it says that 
it is not considered practical to define too extensively how consent shall be given. 
Such a legal definition could be too different from what human relations really are.
 
When consent has been given, it needs to be revealed if it was given of free will, 
i.e., that violence, threats or other unlawful coercion was not used. These are 
the same points that were listed as means in the provision on rape from 2007. 
The definition of rape based on consent that follows from Act no. 16/2018 
does therefore not change much of the contents of the provision on rape.
Finally, in the commentary it says that it is not advisable to change the culpability 
requirement in the rape offence. Rape should still require that the offender acts 
intentionally.89
85 Bragadóttir 2018 pp. 258-261.
86 Cf. section 194 subsection 2 as amended with Act no. 61/2007.
87 The following discussion on consent is based on the commentary handed in with bill of law no. 
16/2018, see þingskjal [Document of Althingi] 10 ‒ 10. mál, 148. löggjafarþing 2017–2018 p. 8. 
88 In H 19. May 2016 (36/2016) it is stated that the victim had originally consented to sexual 
intercourse with the accused but quickly changed her mind and wanted to stop. She told the 
accused and resisted, without him giving this any thought. The accused was therefore found 
guilty of rape, as per section 194 subsection 1. 
89  Þingskjal [Document of Althingi] 10 ‒ 10. mál, 148. löggjafarþing 2017–2018 p. 9.  
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4.4 Effects in implementation 
The new Act has only been applied by the courts for just over two years.90 The 
judgements seem to show that the change of the definition of rape has not changed 
much in practice. This is because the fundamental change was already made in 2007. 
Most of the offences were committed when the provision of 2007 was still in force. 
If penal legislation has changed between the offence being committed and the case 
being brought up in court, the offence shall be judged according to the more recent 
statute, when it comes to both the offence and the punishment. However, punishment 
can never be imposed, unless the act was punishable when it was committed, and the 
sentence may not be more severe than under the earlier statute, as per section 2 of 
the GPC (the principle of non-retroactivity). It is therefore clear that in these cases 
the court is judging in accordance with the new provision. However, the judgements 
often reference the commentary to the Act from 2007 on the contents of rape and 
that the essence is that sexual intercourse has taken place without the victim’s 
consent and that the victim’s right to self-determination in sex is therefore violated.91
 
The first case that discussed the provision on rape from 2018 was about X who was 
accused of being violent towards A and subjugated her to unlawful coercion, after they 
started having sexual intercourse with the consent of both of them. The judgement 
states that it is not deemed that the amendments ‘on section 194 have an effect in 
this case, as the incident fits to the description in section 194 like the provision is 
now, as well as at the time of the incident.’ The majority of the High Court found 
the accused not guilty, as they deemed it not proven that he had the intention to 
be more violent towards A than she had consented to and it was not proven that he 
intended to violate her right of self-determination. One judge delivered a minority 
opinion. There he references commentaries with both Acts, 2007 and 2018, e.g., the 
wording in the commentary from 2007 that lack of consent is included in the concept 
of rape, as it is lack of consent that makes the actions rape and therefore punishable. 
The judge said that X ‘must have known that these violent sexual actions needed the 
victim’s unmistakable consent and that he could not have taken their former sexual 
intercourse and the victim’s consent to sexual intercourse in this case as consent to such 
violent sexual intercourse.’ The judge therefore deemed that X had intention of rape.92
By going through the High Court’s judgements since the law came into force in 2018 
until June 2020, no case considers rape according to the definition from 2018 that would 
not be considered as rape under the provision from 2007. However, it is not impossible 
that such cases can come up when the provision has been in effect for a longer period.
90 Act no. 16/2018 came into force 13. April 2018.
91 See L 26. June 2018 (26/2018), L 14. September 2018 (151/2018), L 28. September 2018 (75/2018) 
and L 1. February 2019 (363/2018). 
92 L 28. September 2018 (75/2018).
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4.5   The effect of the amendments from 2018 
In general discussion, the two definitions on rape, used in the provisions from 2007 
and 2018, have often been put forth as two opposites: on one hand to define the offence 
by listing all possible means, on the other to define the offence as sexual intercourse 
without consent. However, the difference is in fact very small, if any, and the two 
definitions essentially have the same meaning. Consent, or lack thereof, is the essence 
of the offence in both definitions. It is the underlying prerequisite in the definition 
from 2007, and it is stated clearly in the definition from 2018. Both definitions list the 
same means, in the provision from 2007 they are means used for the offence, and in the 
provision from 2018 they are elements in the definition of consent. The content of the 
provision on rape has therefore not changed in substance by having consent added to it, 
as the provisions from 2007 and 2018 are made up of the same elements and they differ 
only in their presentation. It can therefore be concluded that it does not matter which 
definition is used, and that it is a misunderstanding that a definition based on consent 
solves the problem of obtaining a guilty verdict in rape cases. The problem has not 
been solved with this new definition, and recent judgements support this conclusion.
Looking at the discussion above, it can be questioned whether the amendments from 
2018 were an improvement. I think they were, to some extent. When studying the 
commentary to the bill of law no. 16/2018 it can be deduced that the goal of the 
amendments is threefold. One goal is presumably to obtain more guilty verdicts in 
rape cases. This has not been the case until now. England’s experience shows that 
low ratio of guilty verdicts is also a problem even though the definition of rape is 
based on consent.93 The commentary says that requirements of proof shall be the 
same as before, and proof is always difficult in these cases. However, the commentary 
does say that proof could become easier in some cases.94 Another goal is to change 
the public view of the offence and make it more consistent with people’s general 
understanding and sense of justice than the provision from 2007. I think that is very 
important, as the law should serve the general public. It is specifically stated in the 
commentary that the amendments could make young people more aware of the 
importance of consent. A third goal is the preventive effects that the provision and 
discussion about it can have, relating also to the aforementioned point about young 
people and prevention. This is the point that Swedish academics have emphasised.95 
This is also the point that I consider to be the most important. The goal must be fewer 
instances of rape and to prevent the damages that rape causes, both for victims and 
93 See, for example, Leahy, ‘No Means No’, But Where’s the Force? Addressing the Challenges of 
Formally Recognising Non-violent Sexual Coercion as a Serious Criminal Offense, The Journal 
of Criminal Law (2014) pp. 309–325. 
94 Þingskjal [Document of Althingi] 10 ‒ 10. mál, 148. löggjafarþing 2017–2018, p. 2.
95 Diesen, Tagande med våld – Några reflektioner inför en europeisk våldtäktsstudie. Festskrift 
till Madeleine Leijonhufvud (Norstedts Juridik 2007) p. 63. See also Leijonhufvud, Svensk 
sexualbrottslag – En framåtsyftande tillbakablick (Norstedts Juridik 2015) p. 111: ‘En samtyckeslag 
är inte till for att fler ska dömas till fängelse. Den är till för att det ska begås färre övergrepp.’  
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perpetrators. However, criminal law is only one link of many in the struggle against 
sexual violence. Active prevention is essential to the decrease of sexual offences and 
this is also one of the points the Istanbul Convention addresses.96 The main priority 
for Icelandic society today is therefore to provide funds to strengthen the prevention 
against sexual offences and to educate the right target groups, preferably young 
people. This has been done in Sweden, but only to a very little extent in Iceland.97
5. Conclusion  
The enactment of the definition of rape in the Act from 2018 seems to have created 
a consensus in society on the provision on rape in section 194 GPC by providing 
victims with sufficient protection. Voices declaring that the provision does not 
provide enough protection against rape have silenced. In my opinion the explanation 
is that the current definition of rape in the GPC is an example of the law evolving in 
accordance with the needs of society and that the definition tries to secure that the 
law is in accordance with the public’s sense of justice. The current provision makes 
consent more obvious than the provision from 2007 and is easily understood. What 
we can learn from this is that it is not enough for the law to confirm to the public’s 
will, but this must also be the public’s own experience of the situation.
However, the provision from 2007 was so extensive that it can hardly be expected that 
the provision from 2018 will change much in the courts’ handling of rape cases. The 
experience until now is a confirmation thereof. All the same, the provision in section 
194 provides the courts with some space to interpret the concept of consent and it is 
up to them to try to ensure that the provision has the effect hoped for. Therefore it 
cannot be said that further amendments on the provision on rape are needed for the 
time being.
96 Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and 
domestic violence (2011), Chapter III – Prevention (Article 12-17).
97 Bragadóttir 2017. 
